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After forty years of wandering in the wilderness, tobacco litigation has taken
a new turn and apparently discovered the promised land. The attorneys general
of forty states have sued the major tobacco companies in an effort to recover for
the costs which the various states have borne in caring for those injured by
smoking tobacco. At this writing, these suits have produced a "global
settlement"' which the President and Congress may approve, albeit on terms
somewhat less advantageous than those to which the tobacco companies
originally agreed? Although the suits of the attorneys general proceed on many
different grounds, the fundamental claim is similar: the tobacco companies have
profited through the sale of an inherently dangerous product which has injured
millions, and they, rather than the citizens of the various states, ought to pay for
the medical care required by those they have injured.
Were it not that some complaints go to great lengths to invoke a variety of
theories other than liability in torts for the act of manufacturing and distributing
a lethal product,3 one might assume that what the states are asking for is precisely
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1. Whether the tobacco companies abandoned their traditional "no negotiations" posture
because they perceive the actual attorneys general's suits as a threat to their financial well-
being or because they perceive the suits as providing an opportunity to negotiate a
congressionally approved resolution of individual and class-action claims that will place a cap
on liability going forward is an interesting question. See Anthony Flint, Ante Raised for
Tobacco Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1997, at Al. The states negotiated a national
settlement on June 20, 1997. See Anthony Flint, Deal Is Reached in Tobacco Talks, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 21, 1997, at Al. That settlement involved significant changes in the civil-justice
system which provided the tobacco companies with a cap on potential liability to individuals
injured by the consumption of tobacco. See RICHARD DAYNARD & JOHN RUMPLER, CHANGES
TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 4 (Tobacco
Resource Ctr. Working Paper No. 4, 1997). However, the national tobacco settlement has been
questioned by President Clinton and others. See John M. Broder, Clinton Will Seek Tougher
Proposal to Rein in Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at Al; John M. Broder & Barry
Meier, Tobacco Accord, Once Almost Sure, Seems to Crumble, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997,
atAl.
2. See Jeffrey Taylor, GOP Leaders Agree to Bipartisan Effort to Pass Tobacco
Legislation by Early '98, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1997, at A4. As this Article goes to press,
Congress has begun hearings on the proposed settlement. The tobacco companies remain
committed to protection against future civil suits as the quid pro quo for their agreement to
modify their marketing and advertising practices. See David E. Rosenbaum, Tobacco Leaders
Refuse to Budge on Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at A14.
3. Of the 40 complaints, only 11 explicitly invoke products liability as a basis for
recovery: Texas, see Texas v. American Tobacco Co., No. 5-96 CV-91 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar.
28, 1996); Utah, see Utah v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 96 CV 0829W (D. Utah filed
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what the progenitors of strict products liability envisioned: enterprise liability4
Sept. 30, 1996); Florida, see State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466AO (15th Cir. Palm
Beach County, Fla. filed Feb. 21, 1995); Hawaii, see State by Bronster v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., No. 97-0441-01 (1st Cir. Ct., Haw. filed Jan. 31, 1997); Louisiana, see Ieyoub
ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-1209 (14th Dist. Ct., Calcasieu Parish, La. filed
Mar. 13, 1996); Maryland, see State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96122017/CL211487 (Baltimore
City Cir. Ct., Md. filed May 1, 1996); Missouri, see State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco
Co., No. 972-1465 (City of St. Louis Cir. Ct., Mo. filed May 10, 1997); New York, see State
ex rel. People v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 400361-97 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., N.Y. filed Jan. 27,
1997); Oklahoma, see State ex rel. Edmondson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CJ96-1499
(Cleveland County Dist. Ct., Okla. filed Aug. 22, 1996); Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth by
Fisher v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97 April 24-43 (Phila. County Ct. of Common Pleas, Pa. filed
Apr. 23, 1997); Wisconsin, see State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 97CV000328 (Dane County
Cir. Ct., Wis. filed Jan. 27, 1997). Seven of the complaints invoke risk/utility as the test for
determining that cigarettes are defective: Florida, Hawaii, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin. Of the suits involving products-liability claims, only the Maryland court has
granted tobacco's motion to dismiss on the claims of negligence and breach of implied
warranty because of subrogation, but has given the state leave to amend its complaint. See
Philip Morris Inc., No. 96122017/CL211487 (May 21, 1997) (order granting Maryland ledve
to amend its complaint). In Utah, a preemptive suit brought by tobacco for injunctive and
declaratory relief has been denied. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Graham, No. 960904948 CV (3d
Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah Feb. 13, 1997) (order denying preemptive suit). In Louisiana,
the court has denied tobacco's motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney general has the
capacity to sue, that transferring the suit to the state capitol is unnecessary, and that the
industry's liability insurance carriers can be named as defendants. See American Tobacco Co.,
No. 96-1209 (Mar. 13, 1996) (order denying tobacco's motion to dismiss). All of the
complaints filed and orders issued in the actions named above may be found, alphabetically
arranged by state name, at State Tobacco Info. Ctr., STIC Libraries (visited Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://stic.neu.edu/Libraries.html>.
Some states avoid tort theories altogether (Iowa, Kansas, New Jersey, and West Virginia),
while others invoke negligence theories but not products liability (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Washington). Some of the negligence theories focus on specific
behaviors-for example, marketing to children or undertaking to look out for the health of
smokers-rather than on a claim that manufacturing and marketing cigarettes is unreasonable
behavior. Three states, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, have settled their suits. The tobacco
industry agreed to pay $3.7 billion dollars to Mississippi. See Anthony Flint, Tobacco Firms
to Pay Miss. $3.7b, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1997, at Al. Florida settled its suit for a total of
$11.3 billion, which includes a two-year pilot program to educate minors on the dangers of
smoking. Further, the Florida settlement forces tobacco to eliminate billboard and transit
advertising and support legislation regulating vending machines, establishing civil penalties
for selling tobacco products to minors, and instituting harsher civil penalties for possession of
tobacco products by minors. See Settlement Agreement, American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466
AH [sic] (Aug. 25, 1997), available at (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http:llstic.neu.edu/FL/flsettle
.htm>; John M. Broder, Tobacco Pact in Florida Fuels Debate on National Accord, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1997, at A22. Texas has settled for $15.3 billion. See Comprehensive
Settlement Agreement and Release, American Tobacco Co. No. 5-96CV-91 (Jan. 22, 1998),
available at (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/Texas-settlement.htm>.
4. Enterprise liability is hardly self-defining. It refers to a result which the law ought to
achieve rather than to the specific legal rules thought to produce that result. "[T]he theory..
. provides in its simplest form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses
resulting from products they introduce into commerce." George L. Priest, The Invention of
[Vol. 73:867
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for the manufacturers of an inherently dangerous product. Because it is the state
which seeks redress for funds which it has expended, and because those
expenditures can be tied with considerable epidemiological precision to tobacco-
related illnesses, the states' suits pose the issue of whether or not a certain
category of products-here tobacco-should be forced to internalize at least a
portion of the significant social costs which that product inflicts upon society.
Despite the easy assurance with which many commentators dismiss the
possibility of such liability,5 courts have not been as uniform as the critics would
suggest,6 and have never ruled in a context in which it is as clearly presented as
in the attorneys general's suits.
Whatever the outcome of the attorneys general's suits-whether a "global
settlement" endorsed by Congress or litigation and settlement of the various
states' suits-it is worth considering what it is about our tort-liability system
which has permitted tobacco companies to continue their operations unabated for
the more than forty years that it has been known that cigarettes make people sick.
Part of the answer, the subject of this essay, is that tort law has accommodated
itself to cigarettes rather than tobacco companies accommodating to the law.
Just as courts confront the taxing questions posed by these ambitious lawsuits,
the American Law Institute ("ALI" or "Institute") has struggled to "restate"7 the
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,
14 J. LEGAL STuD. 461, 463 (1985). Those who advocate it share the common belief that
business enterprises ought to be responsible for the injuries inflicted by their activities, but
agreement seems to end there. For Nolan and Ursin, both history and policy suggest that
enterprise liability is a mechanism for achieving assured and adequate compensation for
injuries. See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDNG ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
(1995). For other advocates, enterprise liability makes sense because it assures optimum safety
through the mechanism of market deterrence. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing
the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 683 (1993). The
benefits of this approach include creating appropriate incentives for manufacturers to make
their products as safe as practicable, spreading the loss from one individual to all the consumers
of the products, and ensuring that the market reflects the true price of the product (for example,
including social costs). Some contemporary advocates of enterprise liability suggest that "[t]o
achieve the goal of assured, adequate compensation, a common law enterprise liability should
dispense with the defect requirement and limit recoverable damages." NOLAN & URSIN, supra,
at 168. For Nolan and Ursin, the notion of defect (in their plan, for premises) should be
replaced by a requirement that the injury arise out of or be associated with the activity in
question. This appears to be precisely what the attorneys general are asking for in their
suits-partial compensation for the injuries inextricably associated with the use of tobacco. See
James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins ofAmerican Strict Products Liability: A Case
Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443 (1995) (providing
an illuminating account of the intellectual origins of the doctrine).
5. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991).
6. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1995).
7. Restating the law is a tricky business under the best of circumstances. Indeed, it is
probably impossible, and the ALI, to its credit, makes no effort-to achieve the impossible.
Rather, what purports to be a restatement of the law actually represents informed thinking
about what the law ought to be. So what should the Institute do when confronted with the task
of suggesting what the law of products liability ought to be, given that we live in a time when
1998]
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law of products liability. Cigarettes again present the drafters with a need to
reconcile two equally persistent notions: that a product's true costs ought to be
reflected in the market price, and that one ought not disrupt the relative economic
tranquillity of those who make a product, the true costs of which overwhelm any
putative benefits. The proposal by the reporters continues the tradition of
resolving the tension between a product and a principle by embracing the product
through an almost complete8 rejection of the principle. Eschewing the supposed
ambiguity inherent in the phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous,"
the newest revision distinguishes between manufacturing, design, and warning
defects, and announces, with respect to design defects, that there can be no
liability short of the plaintiff establishing the existence of a reasonable
alternative design. The draft elsewhere asserts that whiskey and cigarettes must
be judged by the "reasonable alternative design" test9 making it clear that this
version, like its predecessor, refuses to countenance the possibility that cigarettes
in their intended state are defective.' The difference is that what was once
viewed as a doctrinal aberration required to protect the cigarette industry and
a major political party has made reform of products liability a feature of its political program?
As has been suggested by Marshall Shapo, the wise course of action might well be to do
nothing at all. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 685-86 (1995).
8. This rule is then undermined by an acknowledgment in the comments that there may
be products of such little utility and such great danger that they may be found defective even
in the absence of a reasonable alternative design. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in
Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1436-40 (1994).
9. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c, at 21 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design
applies even though the plaintiff alleges that the category of product sold by the
defendant is so dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all....
[P]roducts such as... tobacco... may be found to be defective only upon proof
of the requisite conditions [of manufacturing, design, or warning defect].
Id. It has been argued that the new draft is more sympathetic to the possibility of tobacco
company liability than its predecessor because the new draft lifts the blanket exemption for
cigarettes and substitutes the possibility of liability if the plaintiff can establish an available
alternative design. See Alex J. Grant, Note, New Theories of Cigarette Liability: The
Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Viability of a Design Defect Cause ofAction, 3 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 368-69 (1994).
10. The current revision follows upon a five-year study of the efficacy of the tort system
sponsored by the ALI. According to the Alliance for Justice:
The study has not been adopted by the entire ALI, in part because of heated
criticism that it favors corporate defendants. Further criticism arose because the
study's funding, which came largely from corporations and corporate foundations.
The Aetna Foundation alone provided $300,000, with the RJR-Nabisco
Foundation adding $200,000; together, these contributions accounted for half of
the project's budget.
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE 53 (1993) (footnote omitted) (citing Kenneth Jost,
Rarefied Atmosphere Masks High Stakes, Deep Passions, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at 14).
[Vol. 73:867
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others producing dangerous products" has been transformed into a core doctrine
of universal application. T.J Hooper2 has been overruled with respect to
products. The exception has become the rule. But, the exception now has its own
exception. At its annual meeting, the ALI voted to exclude tobacco from the list
of inherently dangerous products which cannot support a defective-design case.'3
This is not the first time that the drafters of the Restatement have proposed
doctrine designed to ensure that neither the logic nor the letter of strict liability
applies to tobacco. Indeed, tobacco may well reverse what is thought to be the
traditional relationship between liability doctrine and firm behavior. Rather than
legal doctrine influencing the behavior of those who produce and distribute
products, it can be argued that concern about particular products-especially
tobacco-has significantly influenced the development of the substantive law.
The successful effort to ensure that a lethal product not reflect its true social
costs may have contributed substantially to the incoherence which is at the heart
of products-liability doctrine. 4 While tobacco is hardly the only product capable
of causing damage when used as directed (the 1964 Restaters pointed to
prescription drugs and alcohol as well), it may well be the only product which
cannot be used safely, 5 and has no apparent substantial utility16 beyond
satisfying the craving created by its use.
While we cannot know what would have happened had strict liability for
unreasonably dangerous products carried the day, we do have considerable
information about the consequences of treating tobacco under a regime of
negligence. The history of how tobacco companies have responded to the
command of a negligence regime raises considerable doubt about the easy
conclusion that both negligence and strict liability will produce roughly the same
level of safety. To the extent that we are concerned about safety, doctrine
matters.
11. See Marcia L. Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV.
631, 642 (1987).
12. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
13. See Bob Van Voris, ALIAdopts New Products Liability View, NAT'L L.J., June 2, 1997,
at B1.
14. See Bogus, supra note 6, at 1.
15. There is no safe level of consumption of tobacco. See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO
ASHES 412 (1996).
16. While there may be something to the general proposition that utility is in the eye of the
beholder so that the utility of tobacco is demonstrated by the choice of millions who consume
it, it is not self-evident that one can infer a product has utility simply from the fact of its use.
Since those who consume cigarettes do so at a price which bears little relationship to the social
cost imposed by tobacco, market choice broadcasts a distorted picture of whetherindividual
consumers are making an informed choice. At $25 a pack, how many would smoke? At $40?
We cannot derive utility from consumer choice if the cost to the consumers vastly understates
the actual costs associated with consumption of the product.
1998]
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I. THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the most frequently cited
section in the torts Restatement. Whether as rationalization or inspiration, it has
figured prominently in the law of products liability in virtually every state. It is
widely credited with providing the impetus to treat injuries from dangerous
products under the heading of tort rather than contract. It also introduced the
possibility that the liability of those who distribute dangerous products should
be strict, and to an uncertain extent that possibility has become a partial reality.
It is enough of a reality, in any event, that the current proposal to place design
defect exclusively on a negligence footing has evoked considerable and rather
pointed criticism.
The frequently told history of the emergence of section 402A in its tobacco-
friendly form is as follows. The ALI undertook to restate the law of torts in the
late 1950s, and appointed Dean William Prosser to the role of reporter. At some
point during the process of restating the law concerning products which injure,
Prosser and his advisory group determined that the section they had been
developing, imposing strict liability for unreasonably dangerous consumables,
ought to apply to all products. Before this point, while the proposal still dealt
with consumables, the proposal to impose liability upon the manufacturer of
"unreasonably dangerous" consumables was changed to add the words "defective
condition" as a qualifier on liability. In the face of an objection at the meeting of
the full Institute, Dean Prosser explained that the change was designed to clarify
that firms engaged in the tobacco, liquor, or pharmaceutical business should not
face liability simply because the product they produce may be unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer.
Mr. Dickerson has stated an original point of view which I first brought
into the Council of The American Law Institute in connection with this
section."... food in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer"
was my language. The Council then proceeded to raise the question of a
number of products which, even though not defective, are in fact dangerous
to the consumer-whiskey, for example [laughter]; cigarettes, which cause
lung cancer; various types of drugs which can be administered with safety up
to a point but may be dangerous if carried beyond that-and they raised the
question whether "unreasonably dangerous" was sufficient to protect the
defendant against possible liability in such cases.
Therefore, they suggested that there something must be [sic] wrong with
the product itself, and hence the word "defective" was put in; but the fact that
the product itself is dangerous, or even unreasonably dangerous, to people
who consume it is not enough. There has to be something wrong with the
product.
Now, I was rather indifferent to that. I thought "unreasonably dangerous,"
on the other hand, carried every meaning that was necessary, as Mr.
Dickerson does; but I could see the point, so I accepted the change.
"Defective" was put in to head off liability on the part of the seller of
whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and gets delirium tremens,
[Vol. 73:867
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even though the jury might find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous
to the consumer.'
7
Not content with simply requiring proof of defect as well as unreasonable
danger, the drafters of the Restatement spelled out in a comment that the new
section 402A did not cover cigarettes:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing
a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be
unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads
to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is
unreasonably dangerous."
This "sweepingly cheerful assertion of the non-defective character of a wide
range of intrinsic hazards, many of which are functionally quite distinguishable
from others"'9 represented a dramatic departure from the simple but powerful
idea that those who manufacture and distribute products ought to be responsible
for the injuries that they cause.2 ° Indeed, it represented a retreat from the
considerably more modest idea that manufacturers and distributors ought to be
liable for the injuries caused by "unreasonably dangerous" products. It was not
the only retreat from the grand vision of enterprise liability,2' but it was the only
retreat from the more modest notion that those who distribute unreasonably
dangerous products ought to bear the liability when the unreasonable danger
eventuates.22
17. Continuation of Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 38 A.L.I.
PROC. 76, 87-88 (1961) (omission in original) (statement of Dean William Prosser).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
19. Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liabiliy for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1355 (1974).
20. The idea that optimal deterrence demands that enterprises bear the full costs of the
injuries they inflict is embraced by law-and-economics scholars. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW 192 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 133-34 (1987).
21. The comments to 402A also exempted from the definition of "any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" useful products with unavoidably unsafe side effects (e.g.,
pharmaceuticals and blood transfusions), see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.
k, and made it clear that there is no requirement to warn against dangers of which the seller
does not know nor should have known. See id. § 402A cmt. j.
22. Although the comments to the Restatement work are quite muddled on the point,
pharmaceuticals, knives, butter, and whatever else might be considered to be potentially
dangerous are not, for that reason, unreasonably dangerous products. Their productive or
benign uses outweigh their dangers. There is a powerful argument that cigarettes are
unreasonably dangerous because there is no safe way to use them and no apparent benefit to
their use other than a momentary relief of stress, much of which is caused by the need to feed
the cigarette-induced craving for nicotine. Enterprise liability need not be synonymous with
strict liability. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55
1998]
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The Restatement drafting and adoption process requires academics to persuade
judges and practitioners of the wisdom and accuracy of the academics' effort to
summarize or, more accurately, recast common-law principles. The drafting
process which led up to the promulgation of section 402A required the academics
who supported the notion that those who manufacture and distribute products
ought to be strictly liable for the injuries caused by those products to confront the
practical challenges posed by judges and lawyers who might be inclined to view
the problem from the perspective of potential defendants.
While there was, and continues to be, a strong case for enterprise strict liability
even with respect to useful products with known dangers and with respect to
products with no known or knowable dangers,' these exceptions to the principle
of strict liability at least resonate with notions of fairness to the manufacturer or
distributor. If everything we know or can reasonably be expected to know about
a product suggests that its utility outweighs the harm it may cause, and if as much
notice as is feasible is provided, then it may appear that the costs inflicted by the
product ought to be bome by the consumer. Negligence reasoning supports such
a result, if not strict liability. But, even negligence reasoning does not support the
blanket exemption for tobacco, a product which is arguably devoid of any
substantial utility beyond the satisfaction of a craving created by its use. At a
minimum, those writing and approving the Restatement lacked the information
to make a definitive judgment that the utility of tobacco outweighs its risks.
The Restatement provided no explanation for the decision to exempt tobacco.
It asserted that a product cannot be defective unless it presents a danger "beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."'24 Roger Traynor noted that the express purpose of this language
was "to exclude liability in certain cases," specifically tobacco.2"
Whatever the virtues of emphasizing unpleasant surprise as the basis for
defectiveness, the drafters had no basis for concluding that the dangers of "good
tobacco" were contemplated by those who purchased cigarettes operating with
MD. L. REv. 1190 (1996). Theoretically, one could ask whether the enterprise of manufacturing
and distributing tobacco was unreasonable as evaluated by traditional negligence criteria. The
comments did not leave room for such an approach.
23. For a contemporary argument for.enterprise liability, see Croley & Hanson, supra note
4, at 683. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings ofDefective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 368 (1965), provides a critique of the Restatement's solicitude towards
those who place unavoidably or unknowably unsafe products into the market. Rabin, who
argues that notions of fairness limit the reach of the enterprise-liability concept, points to
tobacco as an example of a situation in which the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, represents
the person who should avoid the injury involved in defendant's enterprise in the first instance.
See Rabin, supra note 22, at 1207-08. Rabin *does not explain why the companies
themselves-who manufacture a product which they know will injure every consumer-cannot
avoid the costs imposed by cigarette smoking by simply getting out of the business of
manufacturing cigarettes.




the "ordinary knowledge common to the community." 2 6 Certainly the tobacco
industry did not believe that ordinary consumers had such knowledge; it warmly
embraced the opportunity to participate in drafting federal legislation mandating
a warning on all packs of cigarettes." As counsel for one of the cigarette
companies later noted, the legislation "'got us assumption of the risk-the
warning label would do that. This was the [industry's] majoj motivation in
accepting the legislation."' 28
In terms of a gross misestimation of future technological and social
developments, the ALI's assumption that the public knew what there was to
know about the dangers of cigarettes ranks with the Supreme Court's decision,
during the 1920s, that rail traffic takes precedence over highway travel so that
drivers must always stop, look, and listen at grade crossings.29 The Restatement
had been drafted, revised, debated, and redrafted before publication of the 1964
report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee clearly linked cigarettes to
cancer. It was written long before the Surgeon General identified a broad range
of other risks such as heart disease. Undoubtedly, many of those involved in the
process of determining that the public knew all that needed to be known of the
health risks of tobacco were themselves smokers. This profound miscalculation
of the true extent of the damage done by cigarettes represents a possible
explanation for the ALI's position.
Judge Goodrich, the then director of the ALI, attempted to explain why good
tobacco should be exempt from liability in his concurring opinion in Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 3 in terms that minimized, to say the least, the
26. See Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1052-54 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990) (finding summary judgment for defendants inappropriate even if comment i is law in
Indiana, since there was no basis for determining consumer knowledge with regard to the
addictive qualities of cigarettes prior to the Surgeon General's report in 1988).
27. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 279-91.
28. Id at 290 (alteration in original) (quoting Robert Wald, one of Lorillard's attorneys).
-Traynor had noted that the absence of warnings on cigarettes had weakened the Restatement's
position that tobacco ought to be per se exempt. See Traynor, supra note 23, at 371.
29. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
30. Fleming James remarks that when his generation "first became conscious of the joys
of smoking, at the time of the First World War," there was a generalized awareness of the
"substantial health hazards by excessive use of cigarettes." Fleming James, The Untoward
Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CAL. L. REv.
1550, 1557 (1966).
31. 295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961) (Goodrich, J., concurring).
Further than that I am unwilling to go. Take a sale of potentially dangerous
subject matter like whiskey. Everybody knows that the consumption of
intoxicating beverages may cause several different types of physical harm. This
goes clear back to the era of the Old Testament:
"Woe unto them that rise up early in the morning, that they may follow strong
drink ...."
"Who hath woe? who hath sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath babbling?
who hath wounds without cause? who hath redness of eyes?
They that tarry long at the wine; ......
If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of it and gets some liver trouble as
a result I do not think the manufacturer is liable unless (1) the manufacturer tells
1998]
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health risk from cigarettes. Agreeing that the complaint against Liggett & Myers
should be upheld to the extent that the defendant had advertised the safety of its
cigarettes, Goodrich noted that those who either make false claims about the
safety of a product or assert knowledge which they do not possess are, for that
reason, liable to the party who relies to her detriment. Turning to the example of
liquor, he argued that someone injured through repeated ingestion of alcohol
could successfully sue a manufacturer who either promised that alcohol would
have no such effect or produced adulterated alcohol. The reason that someone
injured through excess consumption of alcohol could not sue simply because the
product was dangerous, he insisted, is that everyone has known since biblical
times about the effect of strong wine. Without pausing for breath or noting the
difference between alcohol and products which only recently had been identified
as particularly harmful to a small subset of the population, he then argued that
there should also be no liability for a butter producer who sells to someone who
should be on a low-fat diet or someone who sells salted peanuts to someone who
should be on a low-salt diet.
It seems extremely unlikely that Goodrich was asserting as a factual matter that
the dangers of alcohol, peanuts, and butter were equally well known, and that the
consumer's knowledge was sufficient to bar her from recovery for deleterious
effects. Perhaps he referred to peanuts and butter to demonstrate the generic
point that useful products which may cause harm to some are not for that reason
liability generating. While liquor is far more dangerous than butter or salted
peanuts when used to excess, "everyone" knows this and can take preventive
measures. Since butter and peanuts pose a danger to a much smaller segment of
the population, it is the consumer's obligation, or misfortune, to make certain
that they can consume them safely. Cigarettes differ from peanuts and butter in
the sense that they are unreasonably dangerous to every smoker, not just a small
subset. Cigarettes differ from alcohol in both the ordinary constimer's level of
knowledge concerning their respective dangers, particularly in light of the
immediate observable effects from the excess consumption of alcohol and the
lack of any immediate indication of the deleterious effects of cigarettes.32
the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is adulterated
whiskey-made with methyl alcohol, for instance. The same surely is true of one
who chums and sells butter to a customer who should be on a nonfat diet. The
same is true, likewise, as to one who roasts and sells salted peanuts to a customer
who should be on a no-salt diet. Surely if the butter and the peanuts are pure there
is no liability if the cholesterol count rises dangerously.
In this case there was no claim that Chesterfields are not made of commercially
satisfactory tobacco.
Id. at 302 (Goodrich, J., concurring) (emphasis and omissions in original) (quoting Isaiah 5:11,
and Proverbs 23:29-30, respectively); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, at 24
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961).
32. The lack of immediate negative effects from consuming a single cigarette or pack of
cigarettes may help explain why smokers who discount the addictiveness of cigarettes may
rationally believe that the benefits of continuing to smoke outweigh the benefits of stopping.
See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1167, 1197-201 (1998).
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It is possible, of course, that Goodrich and the Restatement were simply
embracing a contemporary view of caveat emptor. Any product not affirmatively
banned from the market was reasonable just so long as no one was misled as to
the nature of the product or the harm it might cause. Contrary to the negligence
principle that customary practice was not necessarily reasonable practice,33
whatever made it to market and found a willing buyer was reasonable per se,
provided only that there be no misrepresentation whether through claims or
silence. With respect to such goods, contract principles, rather than tort,
controlled.
The Restatement view was not universally endorsed. Roger Traynor, whose
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.34 eloquently presented
the case for strict liability in torts for injurious products, noted, concerning the
Restatement definition of defect:
If a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to
exempt the manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other sample
of his product would produce like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a
norm of safety as a basis for imposing liability, should we not scrutinize all
the more the product whose norm is danger?35
Unlike Goodrich, some supporters of the Restatement recognized the need to
explain how the exemption for cigarettes and whiskey could be squared with the
notion that a producer of a product ought to be responsible for the injuries which
are typically and foreseeably associated with the use of the product. Fleming
James, an ardent advocate of broad recovery by accident victims and a champion
of enterprise liability, 36 attempted to reconcile the Restatement position with his
33. See T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly
it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption
of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id. at 740.
34. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
35. Traynor, supra note 23, at 368. Judge Traynor was particularly troubled by the case of
cigarettes:
The cigarette cases illustrate the difficulties presented by the definition of defect
in terms of deviation from common expectation. One of the purposes of the test
is to exclude liability for the harmful effects ofsmoking. Yet, until recently, the
harm caused by smoking was unknown to the consumer, so that the cigarette
manufacturer would be liable under this test to those injured before the danger
became widely known. Even now, assumption of the risk presents special
difficulties in connection with cigarette smoking. Given the habit-forming nature
of cigarettes, it is questionable how voluntarily many consumers are continuing
to smoke. Moreover, there are no warnings on cigarette packages of a sort to bring
home the gravity of the risk. Important though it may be to scrutinize one man's
meat for signs of nonconforming poison, it may more often prove necessary to
scrutinize his conforming poison for signs of warning as to its use and even
reminders as to its patent risks.
Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
36. See Priest, supra note 4, at 470-7 1.
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deeply held conviction that tort principles ought to govern with respect to
dangerous products." He acknowledged that an exemption for whiskey and
cigarettes was inconsistent with the theory of enterprise liability which he
endorsed, but noted that the law may deny recovery to smokers and drinkers for
reasons other than doctrinal consistency. James explained that the issues may be
"tinged with political considerations that may transcend the judicial function.""
Pointing to the nation's experience under Prohibition, James argued that the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment represented a political judgment that the
benefits to be derived from drinking, including the freedom to choose to drink,
when coupled with the evils attendant to prohibition of alcohol, outweighed the
evils of alcohol.39
James recognized that the argument weakened as it moved from alcohol (which
had been the subject of the most vigorous political debate and resolution) to
cigarettes and beneficial, albeit dangerous, drugs. Drugs represented the easier
case since these were extensively regulated and could only be manufactured and
sold with approval. As to cigarettes, however, the argument reduced to the claim
that since the state had the power to regulate the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes but had not done so, this inaction represented a judgment that the
product was not in fact unreasonably dangerous. Thus, while the Restatement
placed responsibility for smokers' injuries on those who consumed the product
despite knowing of its dangers, James attempted to rescue the exemption by
insisting that the absence of a prohibition actually represented a legislative
judgment that cigarettes were not unduly dangerous.4"
37. See James, supra note 30, at 1558.
38. Id. at 1552.
39. See id. "The political judgment would seem to foreclose a judicial holding that the
recognized dangers of whiskey render it unreasonably dangerous." Id at 1552-53 (emphasis
in original). See Brown Forman Corp. v. Brune, 893 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App. 1994, writ denied)
(urging precisely this argument as ajustification for freeing a liquor manufacturer from the duty
to warn college students that rapid intake of alcohol can be fatal).
40. Indeed, he went on to suggest that one could not infer a "political judgment" from
inaction with respect to cigarettes before voters and legislators knew how bad they were:
A political judgment may be inferred from non-action only with respect to those
dangers that are so widely known and understood that they may fairly be assumed
to have been in the minds of the voters and their representatives. This reasoning,
for example, could not rationally justify a ruling that cigarettes were not
unreasonably dangerous before their tendency to cause cancer became common
knowledge.
James, supra note 30, at 1553 (emphasis in original). Interestingly, in a subsequent discussion
of whether a manufacturer should be relieved of liability if the product's danger is one of which
it could not have been aware, James argues that the relevant question is whether the danger is
of the general type which the product generates.
It may be, for example, that the cigarette industry was justifiably ignorant as late
as the mid-fifties of the tendency of its product to cause cancer. But the creation
of substantial health hazards by excessive use of cigarettes was a matter of
common knowledge when my generation first became conscious of the joys of




These unsatisfactory explanations for the exemption for tobacco emphasize the
obvious point that, as Judge Traynor noted, a perceived need to "exclude liability
for the harmful effects of smoking" rather than a search for doctrinal or policy
coherence produced the odd doctrine which emerged from the Restatement
(Second). This is not surprising given the composition of the ALI (which now,
as then, is hardly a bastion of consumer activists or even plaintiffs' lawyers)4'
and the frank impossibility of a lawyer setting aside the interests of important
clients when engaged in the business of recommending what the law ought to
be.42 Indeed, why should lawyers be expected to sacrifice the interests of their
clients or those of their clients' class at a time-the early 1960s-when many
people were still in some form of denial concerning exactly how lethal and
addictive cigarettes were?
The tension between the exemption for tobacco and the claim that products
liability focused on the product, not the conduct of its producer, emerged as
courts and scholars tried to give meaning to the Restatement doctrine. Consider,
for example, the tests proposed by Deans Keeton and Wade43 for determining
when a product is defectively designed. Keeton says that a product ought to be
regarded as involving an unreasonably dangerous design if, "even though
ordinary care is exercised in providing warnings and instructions, . . . a
reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger in fact of the
design as it is proved to be at trial outweighs the utility of design."44 This test is
inconsistent with the exemption for cigarettes unless one determines that
reasonableness has no moral connotation whatsoever. That is, reasonableness is
either an empirical question-what do people do in this situation?-or a
predictive question of how the classic economic rationalist would behave. This
approach to reasonableness involves a rather different understanding of that
concept than has prevailed in the law of torts for the last century. Juries
evaluating reasonableness do make moral judgments. They decide how people
41. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns
a "New Cloth"for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 517-18 (1996).
42. The ALI encourages its members to leave their clients "at the door" when voting on
what the law ought to be, Roswell B. Perkins, The President's Letter, A.L.I. REP., Apr. 1992,
at 1, 3, but this hardly solves the problem given the tendency of lawyers to adopt the positions
they consistently advocate on behalf of clients as their own view. See Vargo, supra note 41,
at 517-18.
43. Stein describes Wade's multipart test as not nearly as favorable to the tobacco industry
as section 402A. See Stein, supra note 1I, at 648. Wade indicates that he and Keeton disagree
on the issue of whether it matters whether it was possible to know about dangers in a product
as of the time that it was sold. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 761-64 (1983).
44. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CUMB. L. REv. 293, 313 (1979). Ten years earlier Keeton had noted that although he was not
critical at the time that the Restatement was promulgated, by 1969 he had become dissatisfied
with comment h and its blanket exemption for products which are not more dangerous than
what is contemplated by the ordinary consumer. See Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv.
559, 569 (1969).
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ought to have behaved. They are invited to do so. That is how the system is
supposed to work.
Cigarettes do not fare much better under the risk-utility test proposed by Dean
Wade." Wade's seven-part test 46 requires a balancing of factors in order to
determine whether a product is unduly dangerous. The seven-part test is designed
to provide an answer to what appears to be a negligence question: "assume that
the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the product and ask whether
he was negligent in putting it on the market or in supplying it to someone else. 47
Cigarettes simply do not fare well under a risk-utility analysis which looks to the
utility of the product to the user and to society as a whole, as well as the certainty
that the product will cause injury, in analyzing whether the product is one which
it would be unreasonable to sell. While the knowledge of consumers and the
ability to make the product safer are factors to be considered, neither is
controlling. It is little wonder, then, that under risk-utility a plaintiff can get to
the jury on the question of whether cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous.48
45. Wade proposed the test in two early articles. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, Nature of Strict Tort
Liability]; John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
Each article noted the particular challenge posed by cigarettes. He noted that under the
proposed test cigarettes "may well be found to be duly safe" on the grounds that "[g]eneral
knowledge and common expectations may well be controlling." Wade, Nature of Strict Tort
Liability, supra, at 842. As Wade's use of the conditional suggests, this result does not follow
ineluctably from his proposed risk-utility test.
46. As described in Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987), the
following factors should be weighed in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition
of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 1247-48.
47. Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 45, at 835.
48. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252-54 (N.J. 1990)




II. THE EXEMPTION MAINTAINED
Courts soon fell in line with the Restatement approach to tobacco.49 For many
years, no court had held it permissible for a jury to determine that cigarettes are
unreasonably dangerous and, for that reason, return a verdict against a cigarette
manufacturer."0 For many years, no plaintiff recovered damages in a cigarette
49. Comment i has been quoted approvingly in a number of tobacco cases. See, e.g., Kotler
v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (D. Mass.) (stating that risk-utility is a
"radical doctrine which imprudently arrogates to the judicial process some very significant
societal determinations" and that Massachusetts law is consistent with comment i), affJd, 926
F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992); Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc.,
685 F. Supp. 853, 856-57 (D.N.H. 1988); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 679
F. Supp. 485,487-88 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (Ind. CL App. 1990); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
578 A.2d 417,420-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
50. In & very early case relying on the theory of breach of implied warranty, Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), a Floridajury in a diversity action returned
a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court
the question of whether under Florida law the inability of the defendant to know of the dangers
inherent in a product it sold defeated a claim for breach of implied warranty. Noting that it was
not asked to comment upon what constitutes an implied warranty or whether the facts of the
case met the Florida standard for an implied warranty of merchantability, the Florida Supreme
Court answered that the defendant's inability to know of the dangerous quality of cigarettes did
not defeat the claim. See id. at 170-71. Unfortunately, the Green case degenerated into a '60s
version ofJarndyce v. Jarndyce as the parties went through two trials and four trips to various
panels of the Fifth Circuit before that court, en banc, made a definitive end to the litigation by
upholding the second jury's exceptional conclusion that although cigarettes cause cancer they
are nonetheless reasonably fit for ordinary use. The Fifth Circuit split over whether this verdict
was consistent with Florida law, the majority concluding that it was. See Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (reversing panel decision and reinstating
jury verdict for defendant); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968)
(reversing second jury verdict for defendant with direction to enter judgment for plaintiff);
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963) (remanding for a second trial
on question of whether cigarettes are reasonably fit for ordinary use); Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (affirming verdict for defendant subject to
certification to Florida Supreme Court as to whether ignorance as to danger defeats an action
for breach of implied warranty); Green, 154 So. 2d 169 (answering certified question). The en
banc court adopted the dissenting opinion from the original panel, an opinion which quoted
comment i as support for the argument that "good" tobacco was not defective. See Green, 391
F.2d at 110 (Simpson, C.J., dissenting).
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), Judge Sarokin
originally ruled that New Jersey recognized the risk-utility as applied to cigarettes, and that the
jury could determine whether or not the risks of cigarettes outweighed their utility. See id at
670-71. After the ruling, the New Jersey legislature passed a products-liability-reform statute
eliminating the possibility of risk-utility analysis in products-liability cases. Judge Sarokin
interpreted the statute to be a codification of existing law and consequently ruled that the
plaintiff could not establish liability through risk-utility analysis. See Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., No. 83-2864, 1987 WL 14666 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 1987). Judge Sarokin's
interpretation of the New Jersey statute was definitively rejected by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1251-52, which held that the statute changed New Jersey law, but
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lawsuit, although this has recently changed as well." This is not surprising in
light of three facts about cigarette litigation: (a) plaintiffs have frequently made
out a prima facie case against the defendant by relying upon more traditional
theories;52 (b) juries have tended to view these claims unsympathetically, given
plaintiff's continuation of a habit which millions seem capable of breaking; and
(c) cigarette companies litigate all cases vigorously and (until very recently)
successfully, thus discouraging plaintiffs from bringing cases which rely on a
controversial theory of liability.
The cigarette companies' approach to litigation highlights a fundamental truth
about the current liability regime. Negligence requires more than that the
defendant ignored alternative and safer design options. Negligence requires that
the plaintiff prove that such options existed and that the defendant should have
known that they existed. Tobacco is hardly the only product for which there
appears to be a dramatic difference between what defendants may know and do,
and what the plaintiff can prove they knew and did.53 As was the case with
asbestos where companies aware of the health effects of their product took the
public position of ignorance and demanded (as was and is their right) that the
plaintiffs prove the opposite,5 4 tobacco companies have insisted that the plaintiffs
establish as true that which the tobacco companies have gone to great lengths to
keep secret.5
But it is not simply the nature of cigarette litigation which has kept courts for
years from ruling that a product like cigarettes is defective even when made as
intended. The view that there should be such a thing as product-category liability
has been subjected to sustained academic criticism. The current reporters of the
Restatement assert that such a view is not simply wrong, but impossible.5 6 In this,
could not be retroactively applied. Interestingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently upheld
a jury finding that cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous (albeit under a consumer-
expectations test) while affirming that same jury's finding that plaintiffs injuries were entirely
plaintiffs fault. See Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
51. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson, No. 95-00934 (Duval County Cir. Ct., Fla. Aug.
8, 1996) (awarding plaintiff $750,000); Nick Ravo, Smoker's Suit Brings Award of$ 750,000
in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, § 1, at 8.
52. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY 131 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
53. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Vintage Books 1996) (1995).
54. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 106 (1985).
55. In 1958, a Floridajury concluded that it was impossible, "by the reasonable application
of human skill and foresight," for a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes to "have known
of the danger" they posed prior to February 1, 1956. Green, 154 So. 2d at 170. As of 1978,
asbestos companies had won half of the cases litigated against them on the grounds that they
could not have been aware of the dangers in asbestos prior to the mid-1960s. See BRODEUR,
supra note 54, at 106. They prevailed in some of these cases at the very time that a deposition
by an asbestos health officer, which demonstrated that the companies had been aware of the
ill effects as far back as the 1930s, was sealed through a gag order settling other litigation. See
id. at 92.
56. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1306-07.
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they follow in the academic tradition of insisting that the courts which employ
doctrines approaching strict liability are misguided."
The current reporters distinguish between enterprise liability (a universal rule
rendering commercial distributors responsible for all physical injuries caused by
their product)"8 and product-category liability. Under the latter approach, once
a court decides that a product category is appropriate for strict liability, then
"distributors or manufacturers would be strictly liable for any harm caused by
their products whether or not these products could be found defective under
traditional products liability doctrine." '59 While the reporters present the classic
straw man of courts, choosing products for this treatment on such criteria as
whether the product is controversial, they acknowledge that courts might well
identify product categories by weighing the social costs of the product against its
benefits. Even under this test, however, the reporters insist that product-category
liability presents such a range of problems with issues of contributory fault,
useful product life, and causation that it cannot be competently applied by
courts.60 The deep problem with product-category liability, however, resides in
the polycentric nature of the inquiry. Invoking Lon Fuller's example of a spider
web in which each strand is connected to and dependent upon all other strands,
they insist that determining whether a product's social costs outweigh its benefits
involves a process in which a "decision with regard to any element affects the
decisions with regard to all the others.""' Adjudication cannot do this because
"neither side can move from element to element in an orderly sequence.' 6 2
Legislative and administrative proceedings can do this, and these are the forums
for determining whether a product's costs outweigh its benefits.63
The academic criticism has been supported by legislative response as well,
although that legislation hardly represents the rational progression from "element
to element" invoked by the reporters. When a state court appears insufficiently
au courant to understand that it must not employ risk-utility analysis and thus
raise the specter of product-category liability, state legislatures provide the
needed corrective.' Without putting too fine a point on it, those most at risk from
57. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479
A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), is an example. In Feldman, the court identified academic criticism as a
major reason for its refusal to extend to all products its earlier holding in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), that asbestos manufacturers are liable
regardless of whether they knew of the lethal characteristics of their product. See Feldman, 479
A.2d at 387-88.
58. "A system of across-the-board liability without defect would recognize causes of action
for physical injuries caused by all commercially distributed products, whether or not courts
would consider such products defective under traditional products liability doctrines."
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1276-77.
59. Id. at 1297.
60. See id. at 1301.
61. Id. at 1305.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1305-06.
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrs LIABILITY § 2, at 12 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995). The reporters note that Louisiana, see Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986), Maryland, see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md.
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a move towards either product-category liability or enterprise liability seem
adroit at presenting their case to the people's representatives.65 In New Jersey,
for example, the legislature enacted a new products-liability statute while-the
Cipollone" case was pending, leading the federal district court judge to reverse
an earlier ruling and now reject the plaintiff's claim that cigarettes were defective
1985), and New Jersey, see O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306-07 (N.J. 1983), all
appeared to impose liability based upon risk-utility analysis in the absence of proof that there
was a reasonable alternative design available. "Each of these judicial attempts at imposing such
liability have either been overturned or sharply curtailed by legislation." REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reporters' note, cmt. c, at 96 (citing LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1991) (overruling Halphen), MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-I
(Supp. 1990) (overruling Kelly), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(3) (West 1990) (limiting
O'Brien)).
65. For a stunning example of this process, consult Paul Glastris, Frank Fat's Napkin: How
the Trial Lawyers (and the Doctors!) Sold Out to the Tobacco Companies, WASH. MONTHLY,
Dec. 1987, at 19 (describing how lobbyists for the trial lawyers, the medical association, the
insurance industry, and the tobacco industry agreed to a civil-liability "reform" which
guaranteed immunity to the tobacco industry). The resulting statute currently reads:
§ 1714.45. Products liability; consumer products known by consumers to be
inherently unsafe.
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if both
of the following apply:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community.
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, and butter, as -identified in
comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
(b) This section does not exempt the manufacture or sale of tobacco products by
tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest from product liability
articles, but does exempt the sale or distribution of tobacco products by any other
person, including, but not limited to, retailers or distributors.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "product liability action" means any
action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not
include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach of an express
warranty.
(d) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or amend
existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972) 8 Cal.3d
121, and shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or commenced
after, January 1, 1988.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1998). The statute was amended in 1997 to omit
tobacco from the list of products known to be inherently unsafe. According to the preamble to
the 1997 revision, the statute was being amended to meet the objection of the Attorney General
of California who took the position that the state could bring suit against tobacco companies
as long as the statute specified tobacco as a product known to be unsafe. See A.B. 1603, 97-98
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 1997). California filed suit against the tobacco companies in June of
1997. See State ex rel. Lungren v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 97AS03031 (Sacramento County
Super. Ct., Cal. filed June 12, 1997), available at (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http://www.stic.neu
.edu/Ca/COMPLA-l.htm>.
66. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
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under a risk-utility analysis.67 Whatever the role of lobbyists in a representative
democracy, however, it is difficult to understand why those who purport to
restate the law should treat the legislative overrulings as confirmation of, rather
than as a challenge to, the wisdom of the resulting doctrine.68
Some thirty years after the Restatement's apparent embrace of strict products
liability, the dominant rule in American law appears to be that manufacturers are
only strictly liable when they make a product different and more dangerous from
that intended. In other situations, courts appear to require the plaintiff to prove
that the manufacturer had access to an alternative means of making or describing
the product in order for there to be liability.
For condemnation of the product itself we have substituted complaints about
what the producer tells the consumer about the product."9 This can lead to
decisions in which the supposed defect seems so remote from the injury suffered
that permitting juries to find as a fact that an adequate warning would have
avoided the harm appears to invite juries, on an ad hoc basis, to find the
manufacturer liable for marketing an inherently dangerous product. To use
alcohol as an example, we all know (or so Judge Goodrich supposed) that too
much alcohol is bad for us. Do we know that drinking straight shots of tequila
over a number of hours can lead to death? And would it really make a difference
to the nineteen-year-old chugging tequila whether an express warning to this
effect appeared on the bottle? Language on a tequila bottle warning a drunk
adolescent to stop drinking before she kills herself seems unlikely to have much
effect in the real world. A decision suggesting that the manufacturer may be held
liable for the failure to print such a warning seems vulnerable to the charge that
67. The New Jersey statute specifically rejected the application of the risk-utility test when
the plaintiff failed to establish liability under the consumer-expectations test. See Dewey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252-53 (N.J. 1990). Although theoretically concerned
with overruling a doctrine employed in a case involving above-ground swimming pools, the
statute makes it absolutely clear that precluding a finding of liability in tobacco cases is one of
its major concerns. It provides that a manufacturer shall not be liable if:
The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user,
and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent
characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person
who uses or consumes the productwith the ordinary knowledge common to the
class of persons for whom the product is intended... [except for machinery-
causing workplace injuries].
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Dewey, held that this statute represented a change in the
law of New Jersey and could therefore not be applied to preclude an action against a tobacco
company commenced before the passage of the statute. See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1251-53.
68. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 681-83 (1992) (adverting to the difficulty of
accounting for legislative action in a legal and analytic discussion of developments in tort law).
69. See Bogus, supra note 6, at 35-36 (noting the "rampant overuse" of claims of
inadequate warnings thus obscuring the underlying issue of whether the product itself is
unreasonably dangerous).
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it is simply giving the jury license to hold the defendant liable for producing
liquor in the first place.7
To a considerable extent, the prior waves of product-liability suits against
cigarette manufacturers have followed this path.7 Juries have been asked to
conclude that the misleading or incomplete nature of communications about
cigarettes has caused the plaintiff to suffer devastating injuries. Juries have been
understandably reluctant to make these findings in the face of common
understanding that cigarettes are "bad" for you. The individual cases may turn
into morality plays about the virtue of the habitual smoker rather than an inquiry
into the appropriateness of manufacturing and distributing cigarettes. The
attractiveness of this line of attack has been further compromised by the post-
1965 federally mandated warnings on cigarettes which the Supreme Court in
Cippolone insisted preempted state tort suits based on the claim that the warnings
actually given were inadequate.
III. THE COSTS OF THE NEGLIGENCE REGIME
Plaintiffs' lack of success in negligence suits against tobacco companies
should not be concerning from a health perspective because, in theory, a
negligence regime produces the optimum expenditure on safety regardless of who
wins particular lawsuits.72 The claim that negligence principles will produce
economically efficient results rests on the assumption that those subject to the
rules will behave in a rational manner to minimize total accident costs. The
fictional individual subject to the commands of the negligence regime is assumed
to act in good faith. If so, it may in fact make very little difference in terms of
efficiency whether one applies strict-liability or negligence doctrine. Under
either formulation, accidents worth (in economic terms) avoiding will be avoided
and those which are not worth preventing will occur.
70. In Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App. 1988, writ denied), the
Texas Court of Appeals held that the lack of warning created a triable issue of fact. Following
a trial verdict for the plaintiff, the court held that the producer had no duty to warn of the
possibility that excess consumption would lead to death, reversed the jury verdict, and
dismissed the case, employing reasoning similar to that used by Fleming James to explain the
Restatement (Second)'s exemption for tobacco. See Brown Forman Corp. v. Brune, 893 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. App. 1994, writ denied).
71. Cigarette litigation is commonly described as occurring in two waves. The first occurred
in the 1950s and 1960s fresh on the heels of scientific acknowledgment that cigarettes sicken
and kill. The second occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s. Both focused upon the
communications to consumers about tobacco. The first wave focused on the misleading
advertising which induced individuals to take up smoking, whereas the second, while invoking
misleading advertising, looked as well to the failure to warn adequately about the dangers of
smoking. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort
Liability, in SMOKING POLICY, supra note 52, at 110, 110-12, 118-20.




Those who oppose enterprise liability insist that the appropriate level of safety
can be reached through a negligence or contractual regime!' There is not a great
deal of empirical support for this proposition or even for the broader proposition
that tort rules encourage safer behavior.74 As with much of academic discourse,
the theoretical case is better developed. The theoretical case assumes a market
in safety in which either rational consumers or reasonable manufacturers have an
incentive to either purchase or create increasingly safe products. Negligence law
would produce this result by forcing manufacturers to employ knowable
technologies to reduce the risk inherent in their product. The failure to employ
these technologies would render their conduct unreasonable and produce
liability.
While the law would not by itself force these new techniques to emerge, that
would nonetheless happen because manufacturers would strive to capture market
share by creating an ever-safer cigarette. Negligence doctrine would penalize
those who failed to avail themselves of the new technologies of safety generated
by competition in the marketplace itself.
The same result might be achieved in a world in which consumers had
sufficient information to choose among sellers of comparable products. Given
that some cigarette consumers are concerned about safety, a rational market
should produce products which provide varying levels of safety at varying prices.
Just as some who buy automobiles choose a Volvo based upon the perception
that it is a safer automobile, so, the theory goes, those consumers of cigarettes
most concerned about safety would purchase the cigarettes which offered the
highest level of safety commensurate with other desired attributes of the product.
On this view of the world, informed consumer choice would push towards the
creating and marketing of safer products.
In theory, tobacco companies confronted with claims that the product they
produced is harmful when used as directed would undertake a number of
activities. First, they would attempt to determine whether or not the claim had
merit. Second, if they determined that the claim did have merit or, at a minimum,
could not be dismissed as clearly lacking in merit, they would attempt to
determine whether there was a way to ameliorate the actual or perceived harm
from the product. This could involve a number of different steps. They could try
to manufacture a less harmful product. They could try to learn whether there
were less harmful ways of using the product they were manufacturing, with a
view towards advising those who chose to use the product of the safest way of
doing so. They could tell those who consumed the products of the risks they were
taking and techniques (if any) which would lower those risks.
They would take these steps for a number of reasons. On a moral level, it
seems fair to assume that all things being equal, neither tobacco executives nor
any of the rest of us would like to make their customers ill unto death. From a
liability perspective, failure to take any action in light of information about the
73. In this context, "appropriate" means economically efficient in the sense that we avoid
the accidents worth avoiding. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort
Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
74. See id. at 422-30.
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dangers of tobacco might make the company liable in damages, and avoiding this
liability would provide the incentive necessary to ameliorate the effect of
tobacco. From a competitive perspective, firms might take these steps in order
to gain advantage in the marketplace by meeting the consumer's desire for
tobacco which could be consumed without injury.
In fact, the tobacco companies took some of these steps and apparently did so
for both moral (at least initially) and liability concerns. What they did not do, of
course, is act like rational actors in seeking a larger share of the market by
producing a more desirable-for example, safer-product.
IV. HOW THE TOBACCO COMPANIES BEHAVED
75
We appear to have paid a huge social price for the failure of courts to honor the
theoretical perspective that produced the revolution in products liability. While
it is impossible to state with certainty what would have happened had tobacco
been subject to an enterprise-liability regime, we do know what happened
because cigarettes were treated like pharmaceuticals or chain saws. The decision
to subject cigarettes to a negligence regime in which custom controlled created
a perverse set of incentives for those who manufacture cigarettes. Since each
company was to be judged by the industry standard, from a liability perspective
the best result for all in the industry is the one that pertains today-every
manufacturer makes equally toxic cigarettes and all consumers, even twelve-year-
olds, are treated as being aware of this.
Rather than the negligence regime creating incentives towards safety, it
produced the opposite result. The tobacco companies never explicitly competed
in terms of safety. Indeed, they assiduously avoided mentioning safety in their
marketing and failed to conduct meaningful research into safer ways of making
cigarettes. Astonishingly, they put lawyers rather than scientists or
manufacturing executives in charge of the research that was conducted, and they
withheld dissemination of the results of that research as privileged legal work
product. Collusion, not competition, ensured that the companies neither
discussed the relative safety of the various brands nor worked strenuously to
bring to market a demonstrably safer product. No plaintiff has yet succeeded in
demonstrating that the "safe" or even "safer" cigarette is within the technical
capacity of the cigarette companies employing any knowable technology.
Plaintiffs may always fail to make this demonstration since no one but the
cigarette companies has the resources or expertise necessary to determine if
75. Our knowledge of the behavior of cigarette companies is necessarily incomplete. It is
based largely upon internal documents revealed through discovery in the case of Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), as well as internal documents of the Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Company. The latter are summarized in the book, STANTON A. GLANTZ
ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996). The account that follows also relies significantly upon
KLUGER, supra note 15. Much of this material also appears in the various complaints filed by
the attorneys general of the 40 states which are suing the tobacco companies primarily in order
to recover for Medicaid expenditures for tobacco-related illnesses (as well as seeking equitable
relief). See supra note 3.
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cigarettes can be made safer, and negligence law provides no incentive to make
that determination. Indeed, it cuts the other way.
The history of how tobacco companies responded to the information that their
product might be lethal when used as intended is neither surprising nor uplifting.
In summary, here is what happened.
By the early part of the 1950s, evidence began accumulating that linked
cigarette smoking with adverse health outcomes.7 6 These concerns led to a ten-
percent reduction in the per capita consumption of cigarettes over a two-year
period and the prominent emergence into the market of filtered cigarettes which
accounted for ten percent of all sales.77 It also led a group of tobacco companies
(all but Liggett & Myers) to retain a public-relations firm, Hill & Knowlton, for
the purpose of responding to the claims about the health effects of cigarettes. Hill
& Knowlton recommended that the tobacco companies issue a statement of their
intention to confront the health questions presented by cigarettes in a frank and
straightforward manner,78 and to create an apparently independent organization,
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, to conduct research into the health
effects of cigarettes.7 9 From that point forward, the tobacco companies were
agreed as to at least two basic matters. First, cigarettes did not cause cancer (or
at least no study really proved this to be the case). Second, since cigarettes did
not cause cancer, there was no need-indeed it was counterproductive-to
develop, market, or advertise cigarettes on the basis that they reduced the
(allegedly nonexistent) risk of cancer from smoking. While a few companies
occasionally deviated from these principles in either research or advertising,"
from that point to this no company has produced and marketed what it claims to
be a safer cigarette.
The tobacco companies' counterattack on the emerging health data proved
successful in marketing terms during the 1950s. By the early 1960s, however, the
companies were faced with the possibility of potentially ruinous liability in the
form of product-liability suits. This led to a deference to lawyers as "tobacco
executives grew dependent on lawyers in framing their every public move and in
the sort of research they undertook privately."'"
What the lawyers wrought was a policy designed to avoid liability in tort. The
companies adopted a siege mentality and worked collectively through four
76. The major studies were by Dr. Earnest Wynder (the painted-mouse experiments) and
by Hammond and Horn (epidemiological studies).
77. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 170.
78. See id. at 164.
79. See Complaint % 51-64, State ex rel. Edmondson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
CJ96-1499 (Cleveland County Dist. Ct., Okla. filed Aug. 22, 1996).
80. For example, Liggett & Myers both developed a palladium cigarette (designed to reduce
the toxicity of cigarette smoke through more efficient combustion of tobacco) and created a
model marketing campaign for it before deciding not to bring the product to market. See
KLUGER, supra note 15, at 455-61.
81. Id. at 227-28. At Philip Morris, "'no move of a public nature was or could be made
without the special approval of legal advisors, a control which was to become more restrictive'
as a result of the liability suits beginning to plague the industry at that time." Id. at 228




parallel groups: the industry's executive committee, consisting of the chief
executives of the major tobacco companies; the "Secret Six," composed of the
general counsel of each company; an ad hoc group of lawyers from outside
counsel for the various tobacco companies, and; the publicists from each
company, as well as Hill & Knowlton. 2 Given negligence principles, the
cigarette companies faced liability if they knew about dangers inherent in the
product but failed to communicate this knowledge to consumers. They also faced
liability if they failed to act reasonably in their design and manufacture of
cigarettes. They did not face liability if the cigarettes were as safe as they could
be, and if consumers knew about the dangers that smoking presented.
During the 1960s, two legal developments shored up the cigarette companies'
positions. The first, already adverted to, was the decision by the ALI to insist
upon proof of a defect, in addition to proof that a product is unreasonably
dangerous, as a precondition to liability. Congress provided the second safe
harbor through its requirement that cigarettes carry specified warnings,
preempting any inconsistent state standards. Although the tobacco companies
publicly opposed the congressional requirement for warnings on cigarette packs,
their lawyers recognized that the warnings provided "assumption of the risk" as
a defense in every subsequent lawsuit,83 as well as the possibility that the
legislation might preempt all lawsuits based upon warnings.84
Cigarettes, then, were neither defective per se nor were they presenting dangers
of which the consumers were unaware. Manufacturing and marketing them was
82. See id. at 228-29.
83. See id. at 290. "'It [i.e., the federal warning requirement] got us assumption of the
risk-the warning label would do that. This was the [industry's] major motivation in accepting
the legislation."' Id (first alteration added; second alteration in original) (quoting Robert Wald,
one of Lorillard's attorneys). The virtue of this approach was not lost on the alcohol industry.
In 1988, following the Third Circuit's decision the prior year upholding a lack-of-warning
theory in a suit alleging that moderate drinking caused fatal pancreatitis, see Hon v. Stroh
Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987), it too became subject to federal warning
requirements.
On and after the expiration of the 12-month period following November 18, 1988,
it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or bottle for sale or
distribution in the United States any alcoholic beverage unless the container of
such beverage bears the following statement:
"GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon General, women
should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth
defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a
car or operate machinery, and may cause health problems."
27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1994). These requirements led a Texas court to essentially reverse itself
and reject ajury verdict for a teenager who had died after chugging tequila. See Brown Forman
Corp. v. Brune, 893 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App. 1994, writ denied).
84. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 290-91:
And privately some in the tobacco legal corps foresaw the day when judges would
grant motions to throw out liability suits against the industry under state tort
common law because all plaintiffs had been adequately forewarned under the
preemptive federal labeling statute. "You bet," remarked Philip Morris attorney
Alexander Holtzhoff, who was on the scene when the 1965 law was crafted, "but
we didn't do much crowing about it."
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not unreasonable conduct. These legal developments effectively immunized
cigarette manufacturers from liability under a negligence regime as long as there
was neither a claim that manufacturers continued to have superior knowledge
about the properties of cigarettes which they exploited in their marketing," nor
a claim that less lethal cigarettes could be produced and marketed. In fact,
cigarette companies did have additional information about cigarettes-
particularly relating to the addictive nature of nicotine-and they did work on
developing cigarettes which promised to be less lethal than brands on the
market.8" The attorneys general's complaints assert, with considerable
documentary support, that the companies acted in a manner designed to ensure
that neither consumers nor regulators would be in a position to demonstrate that
this was So.7
The lure of a safer cigarette created considerable tension within the tobacco-
producing community. To many tobacco executives it was the logical path to
follow, one which had both moral and commercial benefits. If a safer cigarette
could actually be produced, it would make those in the business feel better about
their work (while doing less damage to their consumers), and bring them the
business of those concerned about the ill health which cigarette consumption
appeared to promise. Some of these very executives-as well as many
others-could see the other side of the equation as well. They could see that a
safer cigarette might threaten established "unsafe" cigarettes and thus undermine
the remainder of a particular company's product line. In addition, the existence
of a safer cigarette would undermine the effective legal immunity flowing from
the industry's insistence that it was not possible to make such a product. A safe
cigarette, after all, represented precisely that reasonable alternative design which
would trigger negligence liability.
A number of tobacco companies invested significantly in research and
development leading to the creation of a safer cigarette. One of these companies,
Liggett & Myers, went beyond the research stage. They actually developed a
cigarette, gave it a name, and in fact believed it was commercially marketable.88
But this cigarette never made it to market, just as the efforts of the other
companies never resulted in the production, sale, and marketing of an avowedly
85. Whether or not this conduct generates liability is unclear following Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Cipollone was decided more than 20 years after the labeling
requirements were introduced, and during this period the tobacco companies had no assurance
that they would succeed with their claim that federal law preempted all state actions based on
a failure to warn adequately.
86. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 75, at 108-70 (discussing the "search for a 'safe'
cigarette"); KLUGER, supra note 15, at 455-61 (describing Liggett & Myers's experience with
developing and then failing to bring to market a safer, palladium cigarette).
87. See, e.g., Complaint % 159-75, State ex rel. People v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 400361-
97 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., N.Y. filed Jan. 27, 1997) (alleging suppression of information about
safer cigarettes); id 176-89 (alleging suppression of information about addictive nature of
nicotine); Complaint 113-36, State ex rel. Edmondson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
CJ96-1499 (Cleveland County Dist. Ct., Okla. filed Aug. 22, 1996) (alleging knowledge of
safer cigarettes); id. 137-50 (alleging knowledge of addictive nature of tobacco).




safer cigarette. This outcome was multidetermined. There were concerns that the
safer cigarette would undermine the market for normal, unsafe cigarettes. These
concerns melded with fear of liability once it became clear that cigarette
companies, if they wished to do so, could in fact make a healthier product.
The research and production of the safer cigarette, interestingly enough, turned
out to be a legal, as well as scientific and manufacturing, enterprise. Lawyers
figured prominently in discussions relating to conceptualizing, researching, and
producing the cigarette, and legal concerns apparently played a significant causal
role in the determination never to bring such a cigarette to market. Thus, Liggett
& Myers undertook the development of a safer cigarette (identified as "XA") in
1968.9 By 1975, as the project apparently neared success, all meetings
concerning the project were attended by lawyers who collected all notes after the
meetings. Whenever the project confronted difficulties, the legal department
would "'pounce upon [it] in an attempt to kill the project."' 9 Indeed, the
president of Liggett & Myers reported that he had been told by an individual at
Philip Morris that if Liggett & Myers tried to market such a product, "'they
would clobber us."' 91
Philip Morris had earlier contemplated producing a safer cigarette. The
enterprise was explained to the company's board of directors in 1964 in the
following terms:
"Two years ago, in anticipation of a health crisis to be precipitated by the
Smoking and Health Report of the Surgeon General's Committee, we
undertook to develop a physiologically superior cigarette. [We] put together
a charcoal filter product with performance superior to anything in the market
place. That product was known as Saratoga. Physiologically it was an
outstanding cigarette. Unfortunately then after much discussion we decided
not to tell the physiological story which might have appealed to a health
conscious segment of the market. The product as test marketed didn't have
good 'taste' and consequently was unacceptable to the public ignorant of its
physiological superiority."92
R.J. Reynolds also attempted to develop safer cigarettes.93 As with the Philip
Morris and Liggett & Myers efforts, the cigarette was never introduced and
aggressively marketed from a safety point of view 4 An attorney for Shook,
Hardy & Bacon, commenting upon the attempt by R.J. Reynolds to create a safer
cigarette, noted that such a cigarette could have "'significant effects on the
tobacco industry's joint defense efforts' and that '[t]he industry position has
always been that there is no alternative design for a cigarette as we know them'
89. See id. 122 (alleging this claim).
90. Id. 129 (alteration added) (quoting alleged statement of Dr. James Mold, Assistant
Research Director at Liggett & Myers).
91. Id. 126 (quoting alleged statement of Dr. Mold, relating a characterization by Liggett
& Myers president of an alleged threat from Philip Morris).
92. Id. 117 (alteration in original) (quoting an alleged 1964 Philip Morris research-and-
development presentation).
93. See id. 114 (alleging this claim).
94. See id. (alleging this claim).
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.... 'Unfortunately, the Reynolds announcement... seriously undercuts this
component of industry's defense."'9 5
The pattern which emerged with the safer cigarettes also characterized the
treatment of scientific research into identifying the carcinogenic agents in
cigarettes and into nicotine and its addictive qualities. At the very time that the
companies were insisting publicly and in lawsuits that cigarettes are neither
addictive nor carcinogenic, their own research, shielded from public view, was
establishing the opposite.
V. WOULD A DIFFERENT LEGAL REGIME LEAD TO
DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR?
There is no way of knowing with certainty what the response of tobacco
companies would have been had they confronted differently configured liability
rules. But some things are clear:
1. Managers of the tobacco companies have been acutely aware of the liability
rules governing tort claims for injuries from tobacco. They made decisions in
light of consistent, expert advice as to the possible liability consequences of
those decisions.
2. Lawyers have been intimately involved in decisions about and the conduct
of research. They have been involved in the process of determining whether or
not to disclose information or to bring arguably safer products to market.
3. At a minimum, liability consequences were a factor in all decisions relating
to the response by cigarette companies to concerns about health. They were a
factor in the decision as to whether or not to pursue research in and bring to
market safer cigarettes.
4. The management of tobacco companies understood that there was a trade-off
between the competitive advantages of developing and marketing a safer
cigarette and the liability consequences of demonstrating that less lethal
cigarettes could be produced and marketed.
To apply familiar tort causation principles, the liability regime under which
cigarettes were distributed has been and continues to be a substantial
contributing factor in determining the manner in which the cigarette industry
responds to concerns about the lethal nature of its product. While counterfactual
arguments must always be tentative, this appears to be a situation in which a rule
of strict liability would have led to different and more health-responsive behavior
by those who manufacture cigarettes.
VI. BEHAVIOR UNDER A STRICT-LIABILITY REGIME
The theoretical case for either enterprise or product-category liability is
straightforward. Once a firm cannot evade responsibility for the costs which its
product imposes upon those who consume it and bystanders, these costs will be
internalized into the market price of the product. The certainty that the price of
95. Id 115 (alteration and second omission in original; first omission added) (quoting an
alleged 1987 memorandum written by a Shook, Hardy & Bacon attorney).
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the product will reflect most social costs generated by the product will lead firms
to try to limit those costs as much as possible, thus providing the incentive to
make the product as safe as possible. To the extent that the product remains
inescapably harmful, however, the cost of that harm will be borne by those who
produce the product. This cost will be reflected in the market price of the
product. Consumers choosing the product will be required to pay its full costs.
This will lead them to make more rational decisions as to whether to consume the
product or seek an alternative.96
Economic arguments need to be tempered by the realities of our dispute-
resolution system. Strict liability would have meant that firms were aware that
they might be forced to internalize the costs associated with the harm done by
their products. It carries with it the promise that the fact finder would find the
defendant liable in every case. The argument that the risks of tobacco outweigh
its benefits is overwhelming, and tobacco companies could not depend upon
winning very many cases on the grounds that their conduct was not tortious. The
relative certainty of establishing that the defendant behaved tortiously would
encourage injured smokers to seek to bring suit as well as encourage plaintiffs'
lawyers to agree to represent the smokers.
That the plaintiff's case would be strengthened does not mean that the
defendants would have conceded. It may well have made as much sense to fight
every case to its limits under a strict-liability as under a negligence regime. The
tobacco companies could always defend on both causal and comparative-fault
grounds. Their willingness to do so would make bringing tobacco suits a very
expensive business indeed. Thus, even if plaintiffs could establish causation to
the satisfaction of a fact finder, the plaintiff's comparative fault-his or her
refusal to stop smoking-might reduce the typical recovery sufficiently to make
it unattractive for a plaintiffs' lawyer to take the case in the first instance.97
Unless the specter of strict liability led the companies to settle rather than
litigate, it is possible that even a more "plaintiff friendly" liability rule would not
have dissuaded the tobacco firms from continuing to litigate each case
vigorously.
Causation would remain a problem under product-category liability as well. We
can be confident that in a large population of smokers a certain fraction of their
96. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 32, at 1175-77, 1260-62.
97. A vivid example ofjust this process occurred May 5, 1997, when a six-person Florida
jury returned a verdict for R.J. Reynolds against a plaintiff apparently on the grounds that the
plaintiff had smoked despite knowledge that it was harmful to her. See Glenn Collins, Tobacco
Industry Cleared in Florida Smoker's Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at A16.
The attorneys general's suits arguably undermine the tobacco companies' relatively
successful effort to paint the plaintiff as a morally tainted individual now trying to blame others
for what is essentially a self-inflicted injury. These suits come as close as any in the history of
tort litigation to a genuine effort to force the responsible parties to internalize the costs which
their activities currently impose on society at large. The moral canvas is no longer painted in
shades of gray. The claim is no longer that the companies deceived the consumers who were
then incapable of stopping. That may be true but the outcome of the suit does not rest upon it.
Rather the question is whether producers and consumers of cigarettes should be permitted to




illnesses will be attributable to smoking. When it comes to the individual smoker,
however, the most that a responsible expert can say is that the illness in question
is associated with the plaintiff's smoking. While the magic of the "more probable
than not" standard of proof will likely transform the expert's view into a positive
statement about causation, such statements are always vulnerable to attack by the
defendant before the jury on the grounds that we are talking about "one doctor's
opinion" and not scientific proof.98
These problems notwithstanding, under product-category liability the relative
advantage would necessarily shift to the plaintiffs (given that the defendants'
liability would have been a foregone conclusion). Even if the companies pursued
their scorched-earth policy it could not possibly be as cost effective as the same
litigation strategy pursued under a negligence scheme. Defense costs would
necessarily rise as more cases were brought, more cases were won, and more
damages awarded.
The increased litigation costs would either reduce the profitability of
manufacturing and selling cigarettes or lead to an increase in the price of
cigarettes. Either way, social costs would be internalized and decisions by both
consumers and producers would reflect a more realistic appreciation of the actual
costs of the activity. This result may be sufficient to reduce cigarette
consumption significantly given that tobacco is addictive, that most smokers
acquire the habit in their teenage years, and that the habit develops through
habituated use. If cigarettes are too expensive for teenagers to afford, the theory
would go, many fewer teenagers would become addicted in the first place. The
same result could be seen to obtain with adult smokers who suddenly find the
cost of cigarettes going from $2 per pack to $5 or $6 per pack, a sufficient
difference, the theory suggests, to encourage people to control their addictive
urge for tobacco.
But, would the liability rule change the companies' behavior in ways likely to
enhance the health of those who smoke? There is no way of avoiding a
speculative answer to this question because there is no way of knowing whether
there is anything that could be done by the cigarette companies to make their
product less lethal. It seems safe to assume that, faced with responsibility for all
98. The suits by the attorneys general provide the opportunity for courts to visit this
question in a new context. The attorneys general's suits promise even higher costs to the
defendants since these suits challenge the tobacco companies' traditional legal and tactical
advantages. Causation no longer works for the defendant. While the defendants can
successfully point out that "it is just one doctor's opinion" that an individual plaintiff's disease
was caused by cancer, they cannot successfully make the same point with respect to a
population of 10,000 or 10,000,000. With respect to the individual plaintiff, there is no way
of knowing with certainty what caused a particular condition; we cannot look at a cancerous
cell and read from it the process which caused it to mutate from its earlier, healthy state.
Moreover, it is always true that something other than smoking could have caused an individual
injury. But in sufficiently large populations it is possible to control for all other relevant
variables and to then contrast the health history of smokers with that of nonsmokers. For large
populations we can establish causation in a far more rigorous manner than is possible for an
individual. This, after all, is what the science of epidemiology does. See generally Bert Black
& David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732
(1984).
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who are injured through consumption of their product, the companies would
invest more resources in seeking ways to make cigarette smoke less lethal.
First, there would be no litigation premium for ignorance. The current version
of negligence applicable to cigarettes rewards the conclusion that it is impossible
to make a safer cigarette. This in turn provides companies with an incentive both
to deny the knowledge that they do have and not to acquire new knowledge. As
noted, lawyers have played an integral role in both approving the research that
is undertaken and in determining what happens to the results of the research that
is completed. Results are husbanded and shrouded in work-product privilege
rather than being shared broadly in the scientific community. While it may be
naive to assume that open, well-funded, and peer-reviewed research could make
a serious inroad into the lethal qualities of cigarettes, it is certain that secret,
private, and poorly funded research which is viewed through the lens of possible
negligence liability will only confirm the tobacco companies (and their critics)
in the belief that the search for a safer way to smoke is futile.
Second, the increased litigation costs associated with a strict-liability regime
would probably lead to a greater expenditure of firm resources on research and
development related to safety. Given the enormity of the damage inflicted by
tobacco, it is extraordinary how ljttle has been spent on trying to make the
activity of smoking safer. This is perfectly explicable if we know that it is
impossible to do anything to decrease the lethal nature of smoking and that the
only strategy worth pursuing is that of persuading consumers not to consume. To
the extent that some in the antismoking forces believe this is the case, the
tobacco companies have been only too willing to agree, apparently trusting to the
addictive nature of tobacco to keep smokers smoking regardless of what public-
service advertisements tell them.
Faced with potentially unlimited liability and no continuing advantage in
remaining ignorant, the tobacco companies would probably have taken more
seriously the technological question of whether a safer cigarette could be
produced and successfully marketed. While courts have expressed reluctance to
demand that companies make technological advances in order to avoid an
injunction," the suits under discussion seek money damages, not injunctions, and
it is the defendant's choice as to whether and how much to spend in order to
reduce total liability costs over the long term.
99. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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VII. SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE PRODUCT-CATEGORY
STRICT LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LAWSUITS
FILED BY THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL?
A. Does Strict Product-Category Liability Pose
Insuperable Implementation Problems?
The reporters for the current Restatement insist that implementation problems
preclude a court from seriously entertaining the question of whether a product
category can be defective because the social costs of an entire product line
outweigh its benefits.' 00 Thus there is no need to get to the question of whether
such a rule would advance public welfare. But their claim of insuperable
implementation difficulties does not withstand analysis when it is applied to
claims that cigarettes are defective per se. The attorneys general's suits, even
more than the typical consumer action, provide courts with an opportunity to get
to the merits of such a claim.
The reporters identify product life, causation, and comparative fault as issues
plaguing any effort to employ product-category liability. Since cigarettes are the
ultimate consumable, they do not present the problems which inhere in applying
strict liability to products which remain in service for long periods of time. Both
causation and comparative fault are significant issues in suits brought by
individuals who claim to be harmed through smoking, but these issues are no
more vexing when the theory is product-category liability than when the
plaintiff's theory is inadequate warning or failure to employ alternative
technologies. Indeed it makes more sense and comports more with reality to
evaluate plaintiff's contribution to her injury on the assumption that she knew
smoking was harmful and was unable to stop than on the theory that her
decisions about smoking were a product of inadequate or incomplete advice from
the defendants.
The reporters suggest that even if these issues can be resolved through
adjudication, that setting will not do for resolving whether the utility of cigarettes
outweighs the harm that they cause.' They point to the futility of trying to make
such a decision with respect to small handguns, identifying line-drawing
problems and the unknown consequences of a court effectively banning a subset
of handguns. After all, how is a court to know the consequences of banning
"Saturday Night Specials"? Will it be to drive criminals to use more high-
powered weapons while precluding those who use weapons in a solely defensive
100. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1300-08.
101. Courts are apparently competent to make these decisions if the product is a marginal
one-for example, exploding cigars or pellet-shooting toy guns. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)




manner from access to a cheap and convenient form of protection? Or will it lead
to a growth in the illicit importation and sale of the now-banned weapons?
These are weighty concerns and may, to some, prove decisive against any
effort to apply risk-utility analysis to the category of Saturday Night Specials.
These concerns have considerably less weight when the question is whether a
court should apply risk-utility to cigarettes. The line-drawing problems
disappear-if a cigarette is ever not a cigarette, that case has yet to be made. If
there is any claim that the utility of cigarettes outweighs their harmful effects,
that case also has yet to be made. While the argument that liability rules which
significantly increase the expense of cigarettes may lead to an illegal market in
the product appears to have some validity, the case that such a market would
produce greater social costs than the current legal trade in cigarettes also has yet
to be made." 2 While it is undoubtedly true that more liability may have adverse
consequences for those whose living depends upon cigarettes, that is true of any
liability rule, not just product-category liability.
Those making the case against product-category strict liability do not use
cigarettes as an example and for the best of reasons. Cigarettes pose neither
implementation nor evaluation problems; rather than frustrating risk-utility
analysis, they cry out for it. Curiously, the revised Restatement accepts the
possibility that some product lines can be found defective pursuant to risk-utility
analysis if the product is truly marginal-for example, an exploding cigar or a
toy gun which shoots harmful pellets. 3 Marginality is defined in terms of
whether a rational adult, fully aware of the risks and benefits of the product,
would purchase and use it. Assuming that this test eliminates the polycentric
nature of the inquiry, it defies understanding why an adjudicator would not even
be permitted to apply this test to cigarettes. That the test might not work well
with products which have safe uses-for example, guns and alcohol-does not
explain why it cannot be employed with a product which cannot be used safely.
Cigarette law has always been distinctive. Principles routinely applied to other
products seem to have no application when it comes to cigarettes. Courts seem
prepared to impose liability on producers of products which are far less
dangerous and more obviously useful than cigarettes. If a consumer chooses to
buy a Honda motorcycle without crash bars despite the availability in the market
of other cycles with this safety feature, this exercise of consumer sovereignty
does not as a matter of law preclude the consumer from recovering against Honda
on the grounds that the motorcycle was defectively designed.'O Nor is a
consumer who chooses a convertible top when a steel top is available barred
from claiming that the soft top represented a defective design.'0 5 Despite FDA
102. See Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability. A Comment on Henderson and
Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1157, 1171 (1992).
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 2 illus. 5, at 23-24; id.
§ 2 cmt. d, at 22.
104. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Colo. 1987).
105. See Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); see also Ames v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 514 A.2d 352 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986) (permitting jury to consider whether
lawnmbwer was defectively designed because it lacked a "dead man" switch to disable the
unattended mower when other mowers on the market featured such a switch).
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approval, a jury can believe testimony that a drug's dangerous characteristics
outweigh its benefits, and conclude that no reasonable manufacturer would
market it.' 6
If products-liability law covers these situations, why should it not cover a
product whose dangers so far outweigh its utility? A na'ff might wonder why a
jury is permitted to consider whether a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals ought
not to have marketed an FDA-approved drug whose costs appear to outweigh its
benefits but the same jury is not permitted to consider whether a manufacturer
of cigarettes ought to have not marketed a product that the FDA could never
approve. There is no more satisfactory an answer to this question than that
advanced by Fleming James thirty years ago: "political considerations," not
doctrinal or theoretical consistency, explain the tort law of cigarettes. °0
B. Policy Concerns
We have now had more than forty years of experience with attempts to
compensate for tobacco-related injuries through our tort system. To date, only
two smokers have recovered for such injuries, and the dollar amount of their
recovery probably does not pay for the costs of litigating the cases." 8 As more
information emerges about what tobacco companies knew and when they knew
it and what they did with that knowledge, it may well be that more individual
plaintiffs will succeed in establishing liability either through fraud (claiming to
be investigating what was not investigated) or negligence (failure to develop a
safer cigarette) claims. But given causal and comparative-fault issues, it seems
improbable that tort litigation as traditionally configured will ever cause a
significant change in the industry's basic approach to the manufacture and
marketing of its product.
The attorneys general's suits reconfigure traditional tort litigation in a direction
that may have an impact on the behavior of the tobacco companies. Whether or
not these suits succeed depends upon how courts understand what is being asked
of them and whether it is consonant with the judicial function and the goals of
tort law to respond affirmatively.
As a matter of doctrine, the attorneys general's suits propose the recognition
that the tobacco companies' duty of reasonable care extends beyond smokers to
those who are injured by the cigarette-related activities of smokers. Stated at this
level of generality, the claim presents no unique difficulty for courts. Bystanders
are perfectly appropriate plaintiffs in product-liability actions and there is
nothing exceptional about those injured by secondhand smoke seeking redress
for their injuries. The difficulty is thought to emerge because states are not suing
106. See Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993). See generally James
A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third)
of Torts: A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RuTGERs L. REv. 471 (1996).
107. See generally James, supra note 30, at 1552 (discussing political judgment as a factor).
108. The suits resulting in damages are Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d
Cir. 1990) (reversing $400,000 jury verdict and remanding for new trial), and Carter v. Brown
& Williamson, No. 95-00934 (Duval County Cir. Ct., Fla. Aug. 8, 1996) (awarding plaintiff
$750,000). See Ravo, supra note 51, § 1, at 8.
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for personal injuries but rather for the costs which they have borne as a result of
dealing with the health problems of those injured through smoking.
On its face, the states' claims seem to be superior to that of individual
plaintiffs' since the states' claims pose neither the technical nor justice concerns
typically presented by personal-injury suits seeking compensation for pain and
suffering or lost opportunity or the like. 9 On the causal level, epidemiological
studies should provide a sound basis for estimating the cost of medical services
provided for smoke-related injuries. Courts can be more confident that the
defendant's act caused the injury in question than in any individual claim. From
ajustice perspective, the apparently complicated question of whether it is fair to
compensate plaintiffs for injuries for which they may be the cheapest cost
avoider disappears. Certainly, as between the tobacco companies and smokers,
on the one hand, and all taxpayers on the other, justice requires that the costs of
smoking be borne by those who engage in the activity.
The apparently serious doctrinal problem posed by the state suits arises if the
suits are viewed as seeking recompense for economic loss rather than personal
injury. Financial losses, courts occasionally insist, are not the business of the tort
law of personal injuries." 0
If the state suits are viewed as a claim for purely economic injury, the duty
inquiry takes on a narrower focus: Is the plaintiff a member of an "identifiable
class" whom the defendants knew or should have known would be likely to
suffer economic injuries if the defendants failed to exercise care?"' Short of the
defendants claiming that they were unaware of the existence of the Medicaid
program, the state as plaintiff certainly qualifies under this definition. There is
nothing exceptional in this conclusion; the doctrine of subrogation has always
meant that the insurer who pays for injuries inflicted by a third party then has a
right of action against that party. But the traditional doctrinal formulation is that
the insurer recovers not because the defendant breached a duty owed directly to
the insurer but rather because it breached a duty owed to the insured. In practical
terms, this means that the defendant can raise against the insurer any defenses
which would be available against the insured.
This issue-whether to identify the states' tort claims as resting on a duty owed
to those who will be foreseeably and directly injured by the defendants'
109. At least one of the courts which confronted strict products liability in the early days saw
traditional tort damages as constituting an argument against the adoption of enterprise liability.
Although we believe that it is the function of the judiciary to modify the law of
torts to fit the changing needs of society, we feel that the judicial extension of the
theory of strict liability to all cases where it is convenient for those engaged in
commerce to spread the risk would not be advisable. If enterprise liability is to be
so extended, there is a strong argument for limiting the victim's measure of
recovery to some scheme of compensation similar to that employed in workmen's
compensation. The legislature alone has the power to set up such a compensation
scheme. The court cannot put a limit upon the jury's verdict.
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624, 628-29 (Or. 1965).
110. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).




marketing of an inherently injurious product or whether to characterize them as
simply a claim to subrogation-does not lend itself to a coherent doctrinal
resolution. There is no logic inherent in the doctrine of duty which compels the
conclusion that the tobacco companies do not owe a duty to those who must
foreseeably and inevitably pay for the damage inflicted by tobacco.
To the extent that there is any principle lurking in the notion that defendants
do not owe a tort duty to those who will be financially (but not physically)
injured by the unreasonable behavior of the defendants, it is that courts are
reluctant to impose a duty when there appears to be the potential for unlimited
liability, far out of proportion to the wrong committed."' If this is the basis for
judicial hesitation to recognize a duty, it poses no barrier in the tobacco suits.
Indeed, it argues for recognition of such a duty since the attorneys general's suits
provide the best hope that the tobacco defendants will be held even partially
responsible for the very devastating harm which their unreasonable conduct has
engendered.
Since the emergence of the modern doctrine of products liability, tobacco
companies have demonstrated a unique ability to resist liability for conduct
which creates unreasonable risks. They have also demonstrated a unique
resistance to the impulse to make their product safer. Rather than the current
liability regime leading to either safety or compensation, it has produced neither.
The current attorneys general's suits provide an opportunity for courts to
reconsider these sobering facts.
112. See Rabin, supra note 110, at 1534.
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